The chairperson of the Department of Medicine (DOM) in our academic medical center was concerned because adverse events were occurring and some patients had suffered serious harm. Although these adverse events were uncommon and it was unclear if they were preventable, the chairperson's view of patient safety had no place for them. Reports of adverse events came to the DOM from nurses, pharmacists, and residents, although mostly from risk managers. He also knew that these adverse events were occurring despite an active Quality Improvement Department, a Process Improvement Oversight Committee, a Risk Management Department, and nursing and internal medicine quality assurance teams. The efforts of these well-intentioned groups were not preventing adverse events as much as he expected they would.
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The chairperson of the Department of Medicine (DOM) in our academic medical center was concerned because adverse events were occurring and some patients had suffered serious harm. Although these adverse events were uncommon and it was unclear if they were preventable, the chairperson's view of patient safety had no place for them. Reports of adverse events came to the DOM from nurses, pharmacists, and residents, although mostly from risk managers. He also knew that these adverse events were occurring despite an active Quality Improvement Department, a Process Improvement Oversight Committee, a Risk Management Department, and nursing and internal medicine quality assurance teams. The efforts of these well-intentioned groups were not preventing adverse events as much as he expected they would.
Because the physicians in the DOM were at the center of decision making in the patient care process, the chairperson felt the responsibility not only to continue his support of the medical center's efforts to improve patient safety but also to address the issue more directly. His perception was that the medical center's current way of dealing with patient safety focused more on broad policy issues such as the determination of root causes or the assignment of risk, rather than safety research. In addition, the 133 organizational culture beyond the DOM was not well suited to the open exchange of ideas needed to improve patient care in a complex environment.
Although the DOM already had its own quality assurance committee, the chairperson wanted to further emphasize safe patient care. The quality assurance committee, which had been in existence for more than 15 years, created an environment where diverse members of the hospital could talk about issues, but he did not think that talk alone would adequately lead to safe care. Something more was needed.
PATIENT SAFETY COMMITTEE
The chairperson decided that he needed a committee to extend discussion to action. He developed a patient safety committee (PSC). The goals for the PSC were (1) to evaluate cases of adverse events sent to the DOM quality assurance committee using a uniform process of evaluation to determine those components of care-decisions or processes of care-potentially amenable to improvement and (2) to develop improvement projects aimed at reducing the occurrence of specific adverse events.
The PSC was going to have to deal with a number of barriers before reaching its goals. First, much of the patient care in an academic medical center is provided by residents; second, physicians resist changing their practice patterns unless they are supplied with hard evidence that the change will be beneficial to their patients 1 ; third, many of the solutions to patient safety problems would cross departmental boundaries; and fourth, many of the solutions to patient safety problems would involve the medical center's patient care information systems.
Recognizing that resident practice patterns might have to change to solve patient safety problems, the DOM chairperson appointed the associate director of the medical resident education program as a cochairperson of the PSC. Furthermore, he appointed the associate chief of the section of medical informaticsa medical researcher and educator with a positive attitude-as the other PSC cochairperson.
The DOM chairperson and the PSC cochairperson felt strongly that safer patient care would not be readily achieved within a culture of blame. They wanted to promote a culture of collaboration, group learning, and prevention. The PSC cochairpersons decided that the PSC meetings would be relatively informal and open to all interested parties. This would provide an atmosphere conducive to discussion and a forum for anyone who wanted to talk about patient care safety issues. Patient safety committee members included chief residents, medical informatics, nursing, pharmacy, utilization management, quality assurance, and risk management personnel. The only added requirement was experience in doing research or quality-of-care projects. The team would include, therefore, a diverse mix of people from many sites of care that would be able to conduct experiments to prove that safer care was being delivered.
In examining the balance of the forces that would facilitate or hinder these changes, the DOM chairperson concluded that the driving forces were adequate; caregivers want to be effective and do well by the patient, take pride in their work, avoid the waste of scarce medical resources by providing efficient care, compete successfully in the local health care marketplace on the basis of effective and efficient care, and avoid malpractice (ie, another waste of scarce medical resources). However, the DOM chairperson also knew that there were restraining forces that had to be dealt with, such as the desire to remain in one's comfort zone and avoid change, the tendency to seek scapegoats and assign blame, and the defensive attitude developed in response to the legal environment.
The change agents were skillful and up to the task. The chairperson had decades of management experience and was politically and culturally savvy. He would provide the necessary sponsorship and organizational support. The PSC cochairpersons were respected medical educators. The primary caregivers, the residents, would be predisposed to heed them. In addition, one of the cochairpersons possessed extensive research experience and understood the value and necessity of evidence in the improvement of patient care processes.
These change agents knew that they would need resources to bring about patient care safety changes.
Original cost estimates included the salaries of the PSC members and programming changes to the medical center's clinical and management information systems. Fortunately, the medical center was among the most wired in the nation, so the infrastructure to support e-mail, data storage, and data analysis already existed. Nevertheless, the PSC would need approximately $300,000 annually to develop and implement patient safety initiatives.
The announcement of the formation of the PSC served to unfreeze the previously existing environment. The DOM chairperson took care to foreshadow changes by recounting the most dangerous lapses in patient care safety along with expressions of his dissatisfaction with the current situation. This communication took place in meetings with his peers as well as management and staff within the department of medicine. These communications served to strengthen the driving forces.
Although the launching of the PSC was presented as complementary to existing departments and committees (Fig 1) , its formation was sometimes viewed as an implicit criticism of their effectiveness. The DOM chairperson was immediately called upon to exercise his role as sponsor and protector by standing by his decision and rejecting allegations of re- dundancy. The fact that one of the initial agenda items of the PSC was mitigating the potential for fatal potassium overdosing served to mute criticism somewhat. Addressing a life-and-death issue was, admittedly, a worthy activity.
PATIENT SAFETY COMMITTEE'S APPROACH TO IMPROVEMENT
The PSC's initial charge was to examine lapses and problems in the delivery of safe patient care and identify trends and clusters that merited action. The committee members developed a uniform conceptual framework for evaluating cases of adverse events. 2 The framework included independent review of the clinical care associated with the adverse events being communicated (committee members, rather than providers actually involved in care that results in an adverse event, evaluated cases). The evaluations were done in such a way to avoid "hindsight" bias. 3 A probabilistic model of reasoning and decision analysis became the standards for determining lapses in clinical decision making, and the theory of constraints was used to assign cause and effect for processes of care. [4] [5] [6] The responsibility of the PSC was subsequently broadened to include the development and implementation of protocols for improving patient care. The participatory style of the PSC's leadership allowed all members and their respective departments to participate in the development and implementation of the agreed upon new practices and procedures. All projects were conducted using a pilot project approach with rapid improvement cycles similar to the, "plan, do, study, act" approach to quality improvement. Results from the pilot projects were reported back to the DOM quality assurance committee for refining and advancing the protocols.
The PSC decided to use a uniform process for change (Fig 2) . First, cases are discussed at a "safety M&M" meeting with resident physicians and others. At these conferences, residents are asked to describe reasons for unsafe care and ways to improve. They are candid about systems that get in their way for providing the safest care. This educational session serves 2 purposes: exposure to quality improvement ideas and options for improvement.
Guidelines for care are then developed that incorporate evidence from the literature and insights provided by resident physicians. The guidelines are subsequently sent to all residents and nurses via a "safety e-mail alert." These alerts are sent from chief residents and the PSC. The e-mail alerts are sent weekly for several weeks and residents must open the e-mail safety alerts and respond that the alerts have been read. Residents who do not respond are called by chief residents. The goal is to make sure that all providers are aware of the guidelines and changes in the delivery of care.
Last, the guidelines may be incorporated into a decision alert using the electronic order entry system. Therefore, the approach to improvement includes three components: the timed delivery of education, e-mail safety alerts, and decision alerts.
Feedback on results of improvement projects is an additional aspect of the change model. Patient safety committee projects always involve providing objective data as to the current level of patient care before a project is undertaken and then providing periodic follow-up measurements. The original data and project results are presented by PSC committee members at medical conferences, patient safety seminars, quality fairs, and research forums. These communications reinforce the positive effects of the changes and serve to reinforce their acceptance as successful operating practices, thus promoting the refreezing of the operating environment with the new practices in place.
The PSC was intended as a means to the end of safer patient care delivery. It provides an environment that welcomes reporting potential problems with delivering quality care and patient safety initiatives. The PSC contributes a forum and methods for developing and implementing projects to promote safer patient care. The success of the PSC is judged by the number of these projects and the quality of their results. Descriptions of several projects successfully completed under PSC sponsorship follow. Table 1 shows a complete list of projects.
REPORTS ON VARIOUS PROJECTS Development and implementation of an online adverse event reporting system

Background
The committee's initial charge to examine lapses and problems in the delivery of safe patient care and identify trends and clusters that merited action was marred by lack of data regarding adverse events. The problems and lapses were reported on paper forms and not collated. Putting these forms online would improve the collection of reports as well as allow the use of automated tools for examining their content. It was speculated that use of the online system would alter both the number and kinds of events reported. † Project done in conjunction with department's QA committee, the patient safety oversight committee for Rush University Medical Center, or other departments. These projects affect the institution in addition to the department.
Intervention
An online adverse event reporting system was developed and piloted. The pilot trial showed the need to require descriptions chosen from branching menus along with the entry of free text comments. The system was revised accordingly and put into general use.
Results
The average report collection time was shortened by 2 days. During the first 1 1 / 2 years since the adverse event reporting system was implemented, some adverse event reports have increased (falls, blood products, device events). There has been no significant change in the distribution of the types of events reported; medication adverse events and patient falls dominate.
Development of a model for designing 3-stage interventions to address patient safety issues
Background
As the PSC took on the responsibility for the development and implementation of protocols for improving patient care, the utility of a model for designing interventions became clear. A model would serve as a checklist, provide a standard way to perform repeated tasks, and facilitate comparison of patient safety projects.
Intervention
A model for designing 3-stage interventions to address patient safety issues was developed and used (Fig 2) .
Results
This model proved to be very effective. Its heavy emphasis on measurement provided feedback useful for reinforcing success and identifying areas in need of additional work. Its multimodal approach to communicating the need and rationale for an intervention appears to be essential to the success of several of the PSC's interventions. Its adaptation to the problem at hand became the standard operating procedure for the PSC.
Reduction of the use of potassium supplements
Background
A potentially fatal potassium overdose occurred at the medical center. After review by the DOM quality assurance committee, the matter was referred to the PSC for study. A literature review showed that using potassium supplements or potassium-sparing diuretics in hospitalized patients increased absolutely the probability of hyperkalemia by an amount ranging from 3.6% to 17.3%. 7 A review of prescriptions in the medical center indicated that potassium supplements were also being prescribed for patients with normal or high serum potassium levels.
Intervention
A 3-stage intervention was devised using the model in Figure 2 . Department of Medicine physicians were presented with the literature review information in meetings, seminars, and in e-mail alerts. Surgeons and DOM physicians received the information in online alerts during entry of potassium orders into the patient care information system. The information presented in all 3 modes was as follows.
• If the serum potassium level is 3-4 mEq/L and you feel your patient needs potassium supplements, use only 20-40 mEq per day and monitor serum levels.
• If the serum potassium is 4-4.9 mEq/L and your patient does not have structural heart disease, strongly consider not using potassium supplements and monitor serum levels only.
• Use of potassium supplements may be dangerous if the serum potassium levels are more than 5 mEq/L; your patient is on angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitor, nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDS), or a potassium-sparing diuretic; or has renal insufficiency.
• The maximum total daily dose to treat hypokalemia is 100 mEq/24 h in divided doses (unless potassium wasting is noted). Baseline measurements were performed of the doses of potassium supplements prescribed, and follow-up measurements were made after each stage of the intervention sequence. Each measurement period covered 4 days, Monday through Thursday. For each day, the dose of potassium prescribed and the number of patients receiving potassium were counted. Analysis of variance was used to determine whether the counts changed significantly.
Results
The total dose of potassium prescribed and the number of patients receiving potassium decreased by 73% and 68%, respectively (P < .05). No single stage of the intervention sequence had an effect of its own; the multicomponent intervention was required.
1 Figure 3 shows that most of the reduction in the amount of potassium prescribed was due to the reduction in the number of patients receiving potassium. A conservative estimate of the associated cost savings is $68,000 annually: 27 fewer potassium prescriptions per day at $7 each over 365 days.
Reduction of the use of magnesium supplements
Background
In reviewing adverse events, the PSC noticed that magnesium supplements were being administered in circumstances in which they would not be of any ben- efit to the patient. Nephrology and cardiology teams developed a guideline that noted that magnesium was helpful in a limited number of patient conditions: structural heart disease, arrhythmia, hypokalemia, hypocalcemia, and obstetrical care. Magnesium supplements were being used and serum levels were being measured for nearly every patient admitted to the medical care teams. This universal practice raised patient care costs, unnecessarily complicated the patient care process, and may have contributed to an increased likelihood of other patient care errors.
Intervention
Another 3-stage intervention was devised using the model in Figure 2 . First, DOM physicians were presented with the guidelines developed by the subspecialty teams at the safety morbidity and mortality conference; second, they were sent safety e-mail alerts showing the guidelines. Third, surgeons and DOM physicians received the guideline as a decision alert when ordering magnesium supplements or serum magnesium levels. The information presented in all 3 modes was as follows.
1. Magnesium supplementation is indicated only in a limited number of clinical situations:
• Malignant arrhythmias • Severe hypokalemia and hypocalcemia • Obstetrical care Please refrain from ordering magnesium supplements unless your patient has one of the above indications. When magnesium is indicated, oral magnesium is a more effective supplement than IV magnesium.
2. Magnesium serum levels are indicated only in a limited number of clinical situations:
• Malignant arrhythmias • Severe hypokalemia and hypocalcemia • Obstetrical care Please refrain from ordering a magnesium level unless your patient has one of the above indications.
Baseline measurements of magnesium supplement use were performed, and follow-up measurements were made after each stage. Each measurement period covered 15 days. For each day, the number of grams of magnesium prescribed and the number of patients receiving magnesium were counted. Separate counts were made for surgeons and DOM physicians. Order counts for serum magnesium level were monitored on a monthly basis using routine laboratory volume reports. Analysis of variance was used to determine whether the counts changed significantly.
Results
The changes in the number of patients receiving magnesium and the total grams of magnesium prescribed are depicted graphically in Figures 4 and 5 for medical and surgical patients, respectively. For DOM physicians, the total grams of magnesium prescribed and the number of patients receiving magnesium decreased by 57% and 40% respectively (P < .05). No significant changes were noted for surgeons.
No single stage of the intervention significantly influenced the number of patients receiving magnesium. Again, the multicomponent intervention was required. The total grams of magnesium prescribed declined significantly after the e-mail alert and again after the follow-up period. Although no decline was observed immediately after the initiation of the online alerts, they may have contributed to the declines noted after the follow-up period. In the case of surgeons, our intervention may have lacked essential components: sponsorship by the chairperson of the department of surgery, communication via meetings, and communication via e-mail. This intervention noticeably altered our use of magnesium supplements. A conservative estimate of the associated cost savings is $39,000 annually: 12 fewer magnesium prescriptions per day at $9 each over 365 days. Figure 6 shows the 21% decline in monthly serum magnesium level orders associated with the intervention (P < .05). This intervention noticeably altered our use of serum magnesium level orders. A conservative estimate of the associated cost savings is $280,000 annually: 1500 fewer magnesium level orders per month at $16 each over 12 months. These results are monitored monthly and continue to persist after 1 1 / 2 years.
Stopping the use of "sliding scale" orders for insulin therapy
Background
Serious adverse events associated with the use of sliding scale insulin orders are common. Published studies have indicated that use of a sliding scale to set insulin dosages for managing inpatient blood sugar levels is associated with increased length of stay and increased morbidity. 8 The PSC decided to halt the use of sliding scale insulin orders and replace standing orders with long-acting basal doses of insulin with supplemental regular insulin.
Intervention
The PSC recommended the replacement of sliding scale insulin orders with twice-daily rounds and an increased emphasis on the use of neutral protamine Hagedorn (NPH) insulin for patients on the medicine service. Basal doses of NPH were used twice per day and physicians had to evaluate all blood sugar measures prior to changing doses of insulin.
Results
This intervention caused the use of sliding scale insulin orders on the medicine service to decrease by 75%. While the mean blood sugar value increased, the range of blood sugar values narrowed leading to fewer hypoglycemia and hyperglycemia episodes. Reduction of use of serum amylase orders for diagnosis of pancreatitis
Background
Acute pancreatitis is a common reason for hospital admission. Amylase and lipase levels are 2 commonly used tests in the diagnosis of acute pancreatitis. Current literature concludes that lipase is more diagnostically accurate, yet the use of amylase persists. 10 Furthermore, the utilization of either of these tests to monitor the progress or assess the severity of the disease is contraindicated. A review of the ordering patterns at our medical center showed that orders for lipase levels were accompanied by orders for amylase levels 86% of the time.
Intervention
Another 3-stage intervention was devised. This intervention retained the multimodal nature of the model in Figure 2 but substituted a survey for the online alert and changed the order of the stages. DOM physicians were presented with a survey, an e-mail alert, and an educational meeting. The survey indicated that there were concerns about the utility of amylase and lipase levels in the diagnosis of acute pancreatitis. The e-mail stated that amylase levels should not be used to diagnose or monitor acute pancreatitis. The educational meeting stated that amylase levels should not be used to diagnose acute pancreatitis and that neither amylase nor lipase should be used to monitor acute pancreatitis. Baseline measurements of amylase and lipase order use were performed, and follow-up measurements were made after each stage.
For each day, the number of amylase level orders and the number of lipase level orders were counted. Analysis of variance was used to determine whether the counts changed significantly.
Results
The changes in the daily number of lipase level orders and the number of amylase level orders are depicted graphically in Figure 7 . There was no significant change in the daily number of lipase level orders. The daily number of amylase level orders decreased by 74% (P < .05).
The analyses of variance show that only the educational meeting stage of the intervention significantly influenced the daily number of amylase level orders. The value of a multicomponent intervention is shown by the fact that the educational meeting stage was associated with only a 30% decrease in amylase level orders per day while the entire intervention accounted for a 74% decrease. This intervention noticeably altered our use of serum amylase tests. A conservative estimate of the associated cost sav- ings is $130,000 annually: 17 fewer amylase orders per day at $21 each over 365 days.
The increase in amylase level orders depicted in Figure 7 for August and September of 2004 is noteworthy in that it demonstrates the necessity and value of continued monitoring of outcomes. This increase resulted from the decision to resume using amylase by a specific subspecialty group of physicians. Our monthly measurements enabled us to quickly detect this occurrence. Prompt discussions with these physicians resolved the issue in a timely manner. Figure 8 shows that the percentage of orders for lipase levels that were accompanied by orders for amylase levels decreased from 86% to 33% (P < .05).
MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS
Senior management support of a culture of learning and prevention and an organizational structure that promotes collaboration has provided an environment in which patient safety initiatives can flourish by providing not only safer and higher quality patient care but also a positive financial return on investment.
